The invisible hand of political irrationality | the published version
Though people engage in virtue signaling and rationalizations in politics, there are still social benefits despite bad motives
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I had a paper published in a research journal that focuses on ethics and politics. The article argues that despite the obvious downsides and costs of virtue signaling and rationalizations in politics, there are nevertheless social benefits despite the (sometimes) bad intentions of political actors. Here is the abstract:
Why do we vote, protest, and boycott? Economists explain partisan actions, despite their costs, by arguing political irrationality by a single partisan isn’t costly to them as an individual - they can afford the political irrationality, despite the social costs. And some philosophers worry about the moral and epistemic costs of political irrationality. Here I argue that political irrationality has some benefits: it encourages partisans to engage in virtue signaling and rationalization in politics. And while virtue signaling and rationalization are often epistemically and morally bad, they can nonetheless confer benefits too, like facilitating societal and moral progress.
Here’s a great excerpt from the paper:
There is, though, a subtle mistake in this line of thinking. It parallels the mistake the economist and philosopher Adam Smith identified in the quote at the start of the article: we benefit from the self-interested actions of others, even if that wasn’t intended, or perhaps was the opposite of what was the intended. As Smith writes in The Wealth of Nations, it isn’t ‘from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages’ (Ch. II, p. 19—original emphasis). Here it is worth noting that, just as with virtue signaling and rationalization, the marketplace processes are not always beneficial—there are environmental costs to unbridled consumerism—and that many benefits of the market result from greed and the profit motive. There is a disconnect here between aim and outcome just like with virtue signaling and rationalization, motivated by self-interest, but with some (unwitting) benefits for third-parties in both cases.
You can find a open access copy of the article HERE.