Definitely an interesting argument! But I don't know, I don't really think that seems like a problem for the non-animalist at all. Surely we can just say that saying and thinking "that's me in the mirror" rather than "that's the body which my mind is most closely causally connected to in the mirror" or something is just a convenient way of speaking (I guess this is what you call the figurative response.
Your argument against this was a little puzzling to you. You mention how cumbersome it would be to talk in this way (the getting-ready example) but that's exactly the point! It would be super impractical to speak literally for a non-animalist and that's exactly why we use the shortcut, and why we can't use the fact that we speak in more simple terms as any evidence for animalism. Similarly it is super impractical for mereological nihilists to speak literally, hence why none ever really do--but that in no way commits them to the existence of composite objects.
Your gravy example was also pretty strange to me. If the king insisted on speaking literally, then that would have impractical consequences... Yes? That's exactly why we *don't* speak literally, even if we believe we aren't our bodies. The king doesn't literally have gravy on his face as he has no face (if by "have" we mean being constitutive of him or something). Still there is gravy in a place that he would have interest in knowing about, and when people say "you have gravy in your face" he should interpret that as referring to that place, even if it's not literally true.
'You mention how cumbersome it would be to talk in this way (the getting-ready example) but that's exactly the point! It would be super impractical to speak literally for a non-animalist and that's exactly why we use the shortcut, and why we can't use the fact that we speak in more simple terms as any evidence for animalism. Similarly it is super impractical for mereological nihilists to speak literally, hence why none ever really do--but that in no way commits them to the existence of composite objects.'
The rough idea is that the simplicity of use as a theory -- one need not introduce more abbreviated language and theory to talk about themselves -- is *some* evidence for animalism, though hardly conclusive. But it is *some* evidence. But you're right that things in the personal identity space are complicated and my silly little mirror argument hardly settles the matter.
I'm actually not even sure whether I think it's any evidence whatsoever (or if it is, it's very weak imo). Imagine a scenario where English had developed in such a way that talk of bodies was most naturally done in terms of bodies being connected with people, not being them. In that world your criterion would mean that they should be at least slightly more confident in non-animalism, since it would be more cumbersome to express bodies as identical with people in that language. But I don't think that should have any effect on how plausible they find animalism. After all the contingencies of which turns of phrase develop in a language don't affect the (presumably necessary) truths of personal identity whatsoever.
Additionally it seems very easy to explain why we would naturally talk of bodies as identical to people, even if they aren't. Even if, say, dualism is true, bodies are the only way we ever interact with people, and so it's very natural that we would develop linguistic conventions that identify people with their bodies, despite them not being identical. Similarly in a videogame I might see your avatar and say "there's Jimmy," as its natural to speak that way, seeing as that's the medium through which I'm currently interacting with you. It would be more cumbersome to say "there's the avatar controlled by Jimmy" but I don't think that's any evidence whatsoever that you are actually your avatar (or at best the tiniest sliver of evidence).
'Additionally it seems very easy to explain why we would naturally talk of bodies as identical to people, even if they aren't.'
But that's my point: it even easier for the animalist. And that is a form of evidence. Other views struggle more and that is some evidence against them. Obviously, I don't think the evidence is conclusive or I would be an animalist.
Definitely an interesting argument! But I don't know, I don't really think that seems like a problem for the non-animalist at all. Surely we can just say that saying and thinking "that's me in the mirror" rather than "that's the body which my mind is most closely causally connected to in the mirror" or something is just a convenient way of speaking (I guess this is what you call the figurative response.
Your argument against this was a little puzzling to you. You mention how cumbersome it would be to talk in this way (the getting-ready example) but that's exactly the point! It would be super impractical to speak literally for a non-animalist and that's exactly why we use the shortcut, and why we can't use the fact that we speak in more simple terms as any evidence for animalism. Similarly it is super impractical for mereological nihilists to speak literally, hence why none ever really do--but that in no way commits them to the existence of composite objects.
Your gravy example was also pretty strange to me. If the king insisted on speaking literally, then that would have impractical consequences... Yes? That's exactly why we *don't* speak literally, even if we believe we aren't our bodies. The king doesn't literally have gravy on his face as he has no face (if by "have" we mean being constitutive of him or something). Still there is gravy in a place that he would have interest in knowing about, and when people say "you have gravy in your face" he should interpret that as referring to that place, even if it's not literally true.
'You mention how cumbersome it would be to talk in this way (the getting-ready example) but that's exactly the point! It would be super impractical to speak literally for a non-animalist and that's exactly why we use the shortcut, and why we can't use the fact that we speak in more simple terms as any evidence for animalism. Similarly it is super impractical for mereological nihilists to speak literally, hence why none ever really do--but that in no way commits them to the existence of composite objects.'
The rough idea is that the simplicity of use as a theory -- one need not introduce more abbreviated language and theory to talk about themselves -- is *some* evidence for animalism, though hardly conclusive. But it is *some* evidence. But you're right that things in the personal identity space are complicated and my silly little mirror argument hardly settles the matter.
I'm actually not even sure whether I think it's any evidence whatsoever (or if it is, it's very weak imo). Imagine a scenario where English had developed in such a way that talk of bodies was most naturally done in terms of bodies being connected with people, not being them. In that world your criterion would mean that they should be at least slightly more confident in non-animalism, since it would be more cumbersome to express bodies as identical with people in that language. But I don't think that should have any effect on how plausible they find animalism. After all the contingencies of which turns of phrase develop in a language don't affect the (presumably necessary) truths of personal identity whatsoever.
Additionally it seems very easy to explain why we would naturally talk of bodies as identical to people, even if they aren't. Even if, say, dualism is true, bodies are the only way we ever interact with people, and so it's very natural that we would develop linguistic conventions that identify people with their bodies, despite them not being identical. Similarly in a videogame I might see your avatar and say "there's Jimmy," as its natural to speak that way, seeing as that's the medium through which I'm currently interacting with you. It would be more cumbersome to say "there's the avatar controlled by Jimmy" but I don't think that's any evidence whatsoever that you are actually your avatar (or at best the tiniest sliver of evidence).
'Additionally it seems very easy to explain why we would naturally talk of bodies as identical to people, even if they aren't.'
But that's my point: it even easier for the animalist. And that is a form of evidence. Other views struggle more and that is some evidence against them. Obviously, I don't think the evidence is conclusive or I would be an animalist.